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Dimensions of Rights Consciousness
CAROL J. GREENHOUSE*
ABSTRACT

Commenting on David Engel's Article, this Comment responds
particularlyto Engel's formulation of horizontal and vertical axes as a
metaphor for the ways different analytical approaches to law and legal
consciousness potentially yield *recombinant interpretive questions.
Pursuing Engel's concerns with the embeddedness of local norms and
social relations in state-based and global legal processes, this Comment
suggests expanding the two dimensions of Engel's matrix to four, so as to
highlight the relevance of social distance and temporality in the differing
accounts of law he assays, and in appreciatingth'eir stakes. In so doing,
this Comment situates Engel's essay as a novel and timely critical
engagement with theories of the cultural relativity of law.
David Engel's writings on legal consciousness are mainstays of the
socio-legal literature, illuminating some of the subtlest aspects of law's
relation to personal and community life. Indeed, throughout his writings
on legal consciousness, including the present Article, Engel draws
attention to the nuanced ways in which law emerges in the very relation
between individuals and their communities-that is, as a way of
thinking, speaking, and even feeling one's connections to, or social
distance from, others.'
*

Arthur W. Marks '19 Professor of Anthropology and department chair at Princeton

University, a specialist in the ethnography of law, and past president of the Law & Society
Association and the Association of Political and Legal Anthropologists. Other main
publications include CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, AND
COMMUNITY IN AN AMERICAN TOWN (1989); CAROL J .GREENHOUSE, A MOMENT'S NOTICE:
TIME POLITICS ACROSS CULTURES (1996), CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, THE PARADOX OF
RELEVANCE: ETHNOGRAPHY AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2011); CAROL J.
GREENHOUSE, BARBARA YNGVESSON & DAVID M. ENGEL, LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE
AMERICAN TOWNS (1994).
1. The themes of the present Comment are closely related to previous works of David
Engel. See generally DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW
AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003) [hereinafter
RIGHTS OF INCLUSION]; DAVID M. ENGEL & JARUWAN S. ENGEL, TORT, CUSTOMS, AND
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Among Engel's contributions to the socio-legal literature are
landmark works on the varied ways in which ordinary people
incorporate their understandings of law into their self-understandings,
as expressed in everyday narratives of experience and aspiration-as
men and women, parents and partners, and neighbors and co-workers,
among other relations-who are in various ways aware of having legal
rights and responsibilities. 2 He trains his ethnographic sights on the
often-intricate connections between personal stories and law stories as
he asks-literally or figuratively-how law helps, hurts, or stands apart
from people's most pressing concerns. His work on legal consciousness
thus probes the relevance of law beyond legal institutions, in the
intimate registers of identity, personal agency, choice making, and
social change. 3
Engel has sustained his insights on legal consciousness through
long-term ethnographic and collaborative collegial commitments in the
United States and Thailand. 4 As his present Article makes plain, the
implications of Thai experience extend to fundamental concerns with
the place of law in relation to social bonds beyond the law, and to the
possibility of justice. 5 Such questions reach to the core of socio-legal
studies; or perhaps it is more accurate to say these questions are the
core of that interdisciplinary, interprofessional, international field. For
Engel as an observer, the crucial sight line is not the conventional one
that more than a century of legal sociology and anthropology might lead
one to expect-across some distance between "them" and "us". Rather,
just at the point where one might expect him to stage the question of

KARMA: GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THAILAND (2010) [hereinafter
TORT, CUSTOMS, AND KARMA]; CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND COMMUNITY IN

THREE AMERICAN TOwNS (1994); David M. Engel, Globalization and the Decline of Legal
Consciousness: Torts, Ghosts, and Karma in Thailand, 30 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 469 (2005)
[hereinafter Globalization];David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities:
Educational Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166; David M.
Engel, Law, Time, and Community, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 605 (1987) [hereinafter Law,
Time, and Community]; David M. Engel, Origin Myths: Narratives of Authority,
Resistance, Disability, and Law, 27 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 785 (1993); David M. Engel &
Frank W. Munger, Rights, Remembrance, and the Reconciliation of Difference, 30 LAw &
SOC'Y REV. 7 (1996) [hereinafter Rights, Remembrance, and the Reconciliation of
Difference]; David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal
Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 551 (1984) [hereinafter The
Oven Bird's Song].
2. See generally RIGHTS OF INCLUSION, supra note 1; Rights, Remembrance, and the
Reconciliation of Difference, supra note 1; The Oven Bird's Song, supra note 1.
3. See generally TORT, CUSTOMS, AND KARMA, supranote 1; Globalization,supranote 1.
4. See generally TORT, CUSTOMS, AND KARMA, supra note 1.
5. See David M. Engel, Vertical and Horizontal Perspectives on Rights Consciousness,
19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 423, 427-28, 432-40 (2012).
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meaning in Thailand as an outside observer's concern, he breaks the
fourth wall-this is part of the excitement of his work-and walks onto
the stage himself, carrying with him some pressingly unsettled
questions about the globalization of liberal law and its challenges for
6
socio-legal scholarship.
Instead of framing his project around cultural difference, Engel
turns instead to another kind of difference. His main concern is with
what is at stake in the difference between the narrative of global legal
liberalism (let us call this the 'liberal story") and an account of the
forms of law and legal consciousness excluded by that narrative (let us
call this the "diversity story"). 7 In his Article, the difference between
these stories is registered primarily in relation to socio-legal
scholarship; however, there is also a difference in the way legal
institutions operate. As Engel shows, without the liberal story, one
cannot grasp how transnational legal institutions work through their
jurisdictions. 8 Without the diversity story, one cannot grasp how
political communities work their relations to law's powers and
legitimacy claims. 9
As a law professor and socio-legal scholar, Engel places himself in
both stories, relating the stories' different positions reflexively and
critically. He draws on the device of intersecting horizontal and vertical
axes to highlight the inseparability of subjectivity relative to the
complexities of law lived twice-vertically, as law's object (acted upon),
and horizontally, as its subject (acting upon). 10 His graph, combining
these axes, visualizes the possibility of relating their superficially
opposed perspectives by acknowledging their respective promises and
limits. He calls for a recalibration of both perspectives-each opening a
place within itself for the other-for the sake of rematerializing a sense
of justice around a combination of law's tangible forms, substance, and
techniques, as well as intangible questions of meaning. Thus, his
analysis of the liberal story relative to the diversity story is
simultaneously a call for political openness in a pragmatic sense and
methodological imagination in a conceptual sense. Otherwise, the axes
would remain separate-the liberal story looking to individuals as
adherents, and the diversity story looking to individuals through their
plural engagements.

6. Id. at 440.
7. Id. at 441-42, 448.
8. Id. at 448.

9. Id.
10. See generally David M. Engel, Vertical and Horizontal Perspectives on Rights
Consciousness, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 423 (2012).
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Engel's Article is profoundly relevant to the here and now. It is a
compelling account of neoliberal legality and its sustaining myths, and
the contemporary stakes for the future of law and society in practice
and as a scholarly community. But there is also an enticing classicism to
Engel's Article, and this too merits appreciation. In his implication of
the justice stakes in taking vertical and horizontal perspectives on legal
consciousness as separate, or as he proposes, mutually relatable and
accountable, Engel's argument bears on the fundamental concept of law
as a social field, and thus entails broad implications for socio-legal
scholarship.
This is not the place for a comprehensive review of intellectual
genealogies, so I will focus on just one theorist whose formulation of law
as symbolic of social consciousness has been deeply influential on sociolegal studies. In The Division of Labor in Society, first published in
1893, Emile Durkheim" formulated conditions under which society
could be understood as a moral community. For Durkheim,
individualism derives from social participation and engagement, not the
other way around. Durkheim thus rejected a notion of social contract as
the basis for society, and in its place, offered the notion of collective
consciousness as a rubric for the recursive effects of people's social
participation on their understandings of social norms. 12 This looping
back is also a feature of Engel's Article. The association of society, law,
and moral community was not automatic for Durkheim, as not just any
collection of individuals could amount to a society in the ethical sense he
wished to apply to this term. For Durkheim, mutual recognition,
communication, and collaborative activity are among the conditions
under which self-recognition and self-representation might emerge as
individualism, but in his thesis, the idea of the individual was a
function of social life, not its building block or component part.13
Thus, and this bears on Engel's Article, Durkheim sets the
conditions of liberalism within society, not prior to it or apart from it.
The affirmative awareness of the ethical implications of membership11. For critical syntheses of Durkheim's reception in the sociology of law, see ROGER
COTTERRELL, AMILE DURKHEIM: LAW IN A MORAL DOMAIN (1999); ]MILE DURKHEIM:
JUSTICE, MORALITY, AND POLITICS (Roger Cotterrell ed., 2010). I do not mean to suggest

that Durkheim is Engel's primary source or the principal source for socio-legal studies, but
he is a major source for ethnographic community-based studies of law, and Engel's Article
points to areas of that legacy that might yet be explored afresh.
12. tMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 233-350 (1933) [hereinafter
DIVISION OF LABOR]; 9MILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 145-207
(1958) [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL ETHICS].

13. See DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 12, at 173-74, 228-29; Carol Greenhouse,
Durkheim and Law: Divided Readings Over Division of Labor, 7 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC.
Sci. 165, 165-85 (2011).
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"solidarity" in Durkheim's terms'L--might take various forms, but the
sense of membership in a moral community is crucial to the moral or
ethical bond inherent in his idea of society.' 5 Durkheim's writing on
these points forms part of the charter for ethnographic and other
community-based studies of law-in-society even today in the very
connection between tradition and legal consciousness, such as in Engel's
16
account of Thai traditions in the present Article.
Durkheim
calls
the
sense
of
membership
"collective
consciousness'-the phrase referring not to a group mind but to a
mindfulness of membership that is symbolized by law. 17 The symbolic
register is key because Durkheim is not proposing that law expresses a
collective conscience in some verifiable way, but rather that among law's
functions is the symbolic one of making a society "visible" to itself as a
collectivity.18 Durkheim theorizes a spectrum of "types" of solidarity,
anchored by "mechanical" and "organic" types-the former predicated
on adherence to a group, the latter predicated on self-realization
accomplished through participation in a diverse social milieu. 19
In Engel's Article, the neoliberal legal order comprises a mechanical
solidarity of sorts; its "constitutive outside" is akin to Durkheim's
organic solidarity.' Engel's horizontal axis refers to the everyday settings
where people knowingly navigate their social surroundings through
personal associations with multiple communities. 20 In Section III, Engel
works the horizontal axis as a critical response to the limitations of the
vertical axis-that is, to explain why globalization does not necessarily
foster an expansion of rights consciousness even where human rights
(for example) are recognized and promoted by state and local
authorities. 21 Human rights might expand the legal field, but this only
14. DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 12, at 49-229.
15. Id.
16. See generally, COTTERRELL, supra note 11; ItMILE DURKHEIM: JUSTICE, MORALITY,
AND POLITICS, supra note 11; DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 12; PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
supra note 12; CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, BARBARA YNGVESSON & DAVID M. ENGEL, LAW AND
COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS 5 (1994).

17. DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 12, at 49-229.
18. Id. at 64.
19. Id. at 70-132. These formulations are spelled out in The Division of Labor in
Society (originally published in 1893) but also in Durkheim's other works, especially
between 1888 and 1900. The modern reception of Durkheim's work on law is divided over
the question of what scholars see as his communitarianism. See, e.g. Carol Greenhouse,
Durkheim and Law: Divided Readings Over Division of Labor, 7 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci.
165 (2011) (discussing current scholarly debate over Durkheim's writings on law).
20. Engel, supra note 5, at 448, 454 (quoting Barbara Yngvesson, Border Politics, in
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIOCULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (James G. Carrier & Deborah B.
Gewertz eds., forthcoming 2012)).
21. Id. at 440-49.
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highlights what Engel rightly (in my view) considers to be the
fragmentary and dispersed quality of contemporary social/cultural
fields. 22 Rights consciousness and a resurgence of moral traditionalism
are entirely consistent with Engel's account of contemporary Thailand;
indeed, his analysis is suggestive of a wider state of affairs that includes
the United States at the present moment. The intensity of legal cultures
outside the jurisdictions of the state perhaps (paradoxically) reflects a
loss of the social, as individuals are left to their own devices to find
solutions to ethical dilemmas arising from injury or a sense of having
been wronged. Engel shows that mechanical solidarity remains in play,
so to speak-in that unchecked individualism potentially reproduces the
conditions of mechanical solidarity, liberalism turned back on itself as
23
dogmatic attachment to an idealized social order.
With respect to contemporary neoliberalism, Engel demonstrates
that the globalizing myth of liberal legalism is vulnerable at least twice:
once in misreading the contingencies of its emergence as a teleology,
and again in failing to take into account the contradictory nature of its
transformative project. 24 On the latter point, Engel argues persuasively
that "the discourse of rights" does not "substitute" for tradition in
Thailand, but proceeds alongside it-narrowly and at a distance. 25
This is the context in which Engel's elucidation of the vertical axis
does important critical work. He associates the vertical axis with "the
transnational expansion of the ideology of rights, from distant centers of
neoliberal cultural production in Europe and North America through
the ministries of the Thai government down to the village level"26-like
a cone of light from a lamp in the dark. James Ferguson and Akhil
Gupta refer to such claims to "encompassment" as a feature of modern
states' "spatialization" practices-i.e., localizing practices aimed at
consolidating diverse political communities into a single entity, as if
27
political community and territory were each other's natural correlates.
Engel reminds us that such claims should be subjected to critical
ethnographic scrutiny; 28 "community," in his account, is not limited to
face-to-face communities. Taken together, Engel's vertical and
22. See generally Engel, supranote 10.
23. See id. at 454-55.

24. See id.
25. Id. at 440.

26. Id. at 425.
27. James Ferguson & Akhil Gupta, Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of
Neoliberal Governmentality, 29 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 981, 982 (2002).
28. See Annelise Riles, Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in
the Iron Cage, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 52, 52 (2006) (explaining that singling out a
characteristic and lumping people together under that characteristic ignores differences
among the group).
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horizontal axes make vivid the unpredictably recombinant qualities of
moral community, social distance, political contest, and legal
authority-answering the hierarchizing practices of law-giving
institutions with salutary attention to communities and their place
(literally) in the circulation and consumption of law.
But here a question arises, because if we agree with Engel on this
point (and I do) then we cannot assume the intersection of the vertical
and horizontal axes as if this were guaranteed. I approach this question
from a standpoint found in Engel's earlier work on temporality, in which
he emphasizes the multiple ways in which time, life, and change are
understood and selectively incorporated into legal processes.2 9 Drawing
on that work, we may view the two axes he proposes in this Article as
distinct time-space configurations around law: the horizontal axis
embedded in lifetimes and communities (not necessarily localized
communities) and the vertical axis embedded in official histories and
managerial protocols. 30 Following convention, let us call the horizontal
axis the x-axis, and the vertical axis the y-axis. We might ask about the
intersection of the x- and y-axes in two ways: (1) what real-world
conditions sustain their point of origin (i.e., their respective zero
points)? This would not be an origin in time, but a social location where
the vertical and horizontal axes are not experientially distinguishablefor example, in universities and law schools, in public sector or private
sector bureaucracies, in grassroots (though not necessarily small-scale)
political organizations or credit associations, and so forth; 31 and, (2)
what real-world conditions sustain the (x, y) intersection at higher
values along the axes, i.e., farther out from the point where x=0 and
y=O? At the positions most distant from the point (x=0, y=0),
29. Law, Time, and Community, supra note 1, at 606-07 (explaining how time is to be
viewed separately from the relationship of law and social change).
30. See generally ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011).
31. See SUJATHA FERNANDES, URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN CHAVEZ'S VENEZUELA
113-59 (2010); BRUNO LATOuR, THE MAKING OF LAW: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE CONSEIL
D'ETAT (2010); BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW:
DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 282-87 (2003);

Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Neoliberal Governance: The World Social Forum as
Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW:
TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 29, 29-63 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & C6sar A.
Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005); Ronen Shamir, Corporate Social Responsibility:A Case of
Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A
COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 92, 92-117 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & C6sar A. Rodriguez-.
Garavito, eds., 2005); see generally Symposium, Bureaucracy:Ethnography of the State in
Everyday Life, 34 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 6 (2011). These articles are evidence
of the range of conditions under which bureaucracies must struggle to maintain ideals of
rationality (for better or for worse).
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presumably liberal legal ideology is strongly in force and local practice
barely registers on its "radar." This, too, is a social location-for
32
example, human rights activism on the part of indigenous women,
33
sovereignty movements premised on cultural property claims,
International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans conditioned on
structural adjustments, 34 or, to choose a current example, a human
rights suit brought against Greece by its hedge fund creditors.3 5 As one
moves away from the point (x=0, y=0), the asymmetries of power
potentially expand to the point of each axis effectively blocking access to
the other-recalling that the axes represent the interrelated effects of
diverse legal discourses in actual social locations.
Thus, the motif of the graph also draws attention to the potential for
a "blind spot in our knowledge" 36-a conceptual void created when one
axis or the other is not just omitted, but foreclosed from the other's
account. This happens, for example, when political agency is occluded as
a generic cultural difference-as in cultural relativist critiques of human
rights tribunals' claims to universal jurisdiction. But cultural relativism
in this sense of the phrase is itself limited to the void-its notion of
culture stripped of political community and vitality, and pre-coded for
incommensurability. Engel refers to the "exhaustion" of the
universalist-relativist debate in socio-legal studies, but he does not
explicitly draw attention to the richly provocative formulation of
relativity he offers in place of tired relativisms.3 7 Relativism and
relativity are not synonyms. Relativism stabilizes the observer's
standpoint outside of the observed scene. Relativity, on the other hand,
destabilizes
the observer's standpoint, since there can be no
"outside"38-hence the importance of breaking. down the wall between
the field-as-object and the field-as-subject/discipline.
To map pathways into this zone of nonmeeting, we need two further
dimensions beyond the different renderings of time-space within and
beyond the neoliberal imaginary. This brings us back to Durkheim.

32. See generally AnnJanette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in
Indicators:MeasuringHuman Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 253 (2009).
33. See generally JOHN L. COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF, ETHNICITY, INC. 56 (2009).
34. JANET ROITMAN, FISCAL DISOBEDIENCE: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF ECONOMIC
REGULATION IN CENTRAL AFRICA 4 n.6 (2005).

35. Landon Thomas Jr., Hedge Funds May Sue Greece if It Tries to Force Losses, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19business/global/hedge-funds-maysue-greece-if-it-tries-to-force-loss.html?-r=2&scp=2&sq=greece%20hedge%2funds&st=cse.
36. See RALPH ELLISON, SHADOW AND ACT 311 (special ed. 1994).
37. Engel, supra note 5, at 441.
38. Id. at 455 (quoting Barbara Yngvesson, Border Politics, in THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIOCULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (James G. Carrier & Deborah B. Gewertz eds.,
forthcoming 2012)).
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Durkheim named "volume" and "density" (i.e., scale and role density) as
the drivers of organic solidarity. 39 In Durkheim's thinking, expanding
the number of social roles (volume) as well as any individual's roles
(density) increases the likelihood that the conditions of organic
solidarity will be met in an enduring way. Fulfilling those conditions
would mean that the recognition and articulation of diverse normative
repertoires is an everyday occurrence. The dynamic quality of the terms
in Durkheim's usage is suggestive of Albert Einstein's later formulation
of relativity around the dimensions of time, space, volume, and
velocity-though Einstein was explicit in refusing any analogy to social
life. 40 Still, these additional terms underscore the difference between a
perspectival relativism (two dimensions) and the relativity of experience
theoretical
possibility
(four
dimensions).
Relativism
draws
comparatively, between systems; relativity draws theoretical possibility
into the very midst of experience - as relateability. Accordingly, Engel's
relativity brings us back to fundamentals in an exciting and productive
way.
For socio-legal scholars engaged with globalization, the theoretical
import of Engel's analysis of the limitations of a liberal discourse of
rights is at least three-fold. First, the discourse of legal liberalism
represented by Engel's vertical dimension is not fully assimilable to the
knowledge(s) or experience(s) associated with the heterogeneous legal
cultures and normative communities that comprise the horizontal
dimension. Cultural relativity is profoundly important to Engel's
concept of legal consciousness, but cultural relativism fails (for reasons
he elucidates throughout) as a challenge to legal liberalism because it is
encompassed within its discourse, pre-coded for erasure.
Second, in drawing our attention from either axis to the relationship
between them, Engel productively moves away from prevalent concerns
with the production of law and its (putative) uptake, toward the
circulation and consumption of legal ideas as constitutive social
relations in themselves. This shift of focus is illuminating, particularly
in correcting the mythic "universalism" of human rights law as a
bestowal of the global north upon the global south. In place of those

39. DrviSION OF LABOR, supra note 12, at 152, 233-82.
40. See ALBERT EINSTEIN, THE MEANING OF RELATIVITY (2005); ALBERT EINSTEIN,
RELATIviTY: THE SPECIAL AND THE GENERAL THEORY (2006); ALBERT EINSTEIN,

SIDELIGHTS ON RELATIVITY (1922). Einstein's refusal to extend (by application or
metaphor) his theory of relativity to social relations was part of his break with Henri
Bergson. See SUZANNE GUERLAC,
BERGSON (2006).
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myths, the demand for human rights together with their formulations
41
can be situated more diversely in relation to social movements.
Third, by considering each of his two axes as intersecting
arrangements of social connections and distances, Engel productively
and provocatively forecloses the possibility of an external observer's
position. This highlights the alienation intrinsic to the liberal narrative,
as well as new possibilities of engagement and discovery. Indeed,
merging the subject and object of socio-legal studies is a ringing keynote
of his essay-a compelling appeal that takes us back to our intellectual
foundations and quickens what is best and most enduring in our shared
craft.

41. See generally JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN L. COMAROFF, THEORY OF THE SOUTH: OR,
HOW EURO-AMERICA IS EVOLVING TOWARD AFRICA (2012); SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST
UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010).

